Introduction
The Baltic States belong to a rather specific North Baltic region whose essential political dominant for a long time was Russia (the Soviet Union). Having played the role of the catalyst for the downfall of the Soviet Union, and afterwards having successfully overcome the main stages of the restoration of the democratic state and having chosen the way of integration into the Western security community, they embody in their recent history the essential tendencies of the post-soviet political transformation of Europe. After the restoration of independence, the Baltic States took the first steps in relations with the EU and * Dr. Gražina Miniotaitė is a Professor of the Department of Political Science of the Military Academy of Lithuania. Address for correspondence: Šilo 5a, LT-10322 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370 5 2103569, e-mail: grazina.m@gmail.com
The Baltic States and Europeanization
After the restoration of independence in the political discourse of the Baltic States, two primary conceptions of the state's establishment came to light from the very beginning: the restorationist and the integrationist. The first relates statehood to the reconstruction of basic values and geopolitical attitudes of the pre-war nation state; the second is oriented towards a cosmopolitan integral Europe, towards becoming a "normal" Western state. This duality in the foreign policy of the Baltic States manifests itself as the tension between the construction of a nation state identity and integrationist foreign policy practices 7 . The identity of a nation state calls for the exclusion or sovereignty policy, while the essential foreign policy objective of the "return to Europe" or to the Western security community requires the policies of inclusion and integration implied in normative Europeanization. According to Douglas Brommesson, Europeanization is "a top-down process based on logic of appropriateness, where states with a close relationship to the EU, i.e. candidate or member states, develop a commitment to a European centre, and their normative point of departure is changed" 8 . A European identity is being formed which is marked by the loyalty of the state to European norms and the commitment to protect them from external influence. On the other hand, Europeanization is not only the implementation of the norms handed down from the top (the centre), but also a process during which member states use the EU as an instrument for shifting national interests to the European level 9 . Generally, the implementation of norms handed down from the top is associated with small new states, whereas the instrumental EU treatment is associated with major influential states. The role of the instrument, coordinating the top and the bottom, i.e. the norms of the centre and member state's interests, is attributed to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU. In the relationship between EU member states and the CFSP, the top and the bottom merge. This process relies on Brussels directives and foreign policy visions and objectives of a member state (Table 1) . Lee-Ohlsson (2009) 
10
Europeanization in foreign policy is not a passive process; it is the relationship between integration (adaptation) and national differentiation, in other words -the interaction of inclusion and exclusion. In the relationship of the Baltic States with the EU, it is possible to detect tendencies of both inclusion and exclusion. They are rather directly associated with interpretation peculiarities of Europe in their political discourse. Seeking to become members of the EU, the Baltic States treated Europe as a community of nation states, the security of which was guaranteed by NATO. As Martin Marcussen and Klaus Roscher point out, this image of Europe is usually "employed" by those states that orientate themselves to the liberal nationalist identity. The latter is marked by "We" here confined to one's own nation and state 11 . It is not by accident that foreign and security policy of the Baltic States, while seeking the membership of the EU, was orientated towards national security, territorial defense grounded on conscription, and construction of nation state identity. In the Baltic States political discourse after they became EU members, the ever growing role falls to the conception of Europe as a normative power
Foreign Policy of the Baltic States on the Way to Europe
The response of Western states to the aspiration for the EU and NATO membership shared in essence by nearly all states of the post-soviet space was the promulgation of common membership criteria known as the Copenhagen criteria (1993) and the Study on NATO Enlargement (1995). The criteria were supplemented by the creation of their implementation control and evaluation mechanism. The aspiration process towards the membership of NATO and the EU becomes a process of the construction of the Baltic States according to the model of Western democracy calling for essential political and economic reforms as well as changes in foreign and security and defense policy.
The EU and NATO can be described as constitutive institutions which, by submitting to Government characteristics and objectives of a member state, substantially contribute to defining the identities, values, and interests of the actors. Frank Schimmelfennig claims that the EU basis is a post-nationalist liberal identity, the cultural content of which is confined to political culture. Respectively, the EU grants membership to those states which accept its liberal values and which firmly adhere to its liberal norms, i.e. personal freedom, civil freedoms, and political rights 13 . Thus, the EU enlargement to the East is grounded on the principle of conditionality. Let us look into what changes took place in the Baltic States when they attempted to comply with the membership criteria and how their aspiration towards the EU membership affected their political identity as well as foreign and security policy.
After the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1993-1994 14 , the Western direction of the Baltic States' foreign policy became irreversible. Good relations with neighbors and the membership of the EU and NATO became primary foreign policy objectives. Though seeking the same objectives, the Baltic States operated separately like rivals emphasizing their geographic and historical exclusivity 15 . At that time their political identity acquired geographical definiteness. Estonia considered Finland its primary partner on the way to the EU. In the speeches of its President and other officials, the identity of Estonia as a 18 . The social differentiation of the European geographic space possesses not only a spatial dimension, but also that of time. The North West is faster, the South East -slower. In this context, the integration of Europe can be treated as an attempt to neutralize different speeds of the old Europe and synchronize its development in space and time. Estonia, associating itself with the North, has chosen a rational, pragmatic, fast way to Europe. Meanwhile, Lithuania turned to the South, not only because of the strategic partnership with Poland, but also seeking "to return home" as a civilized European state. Latvia is closer to Estonia than to Lithuania. This different spatial self-localization of the Baltic States is reflected in their foreign and security policy as a choice between the provisions of pragmatism and idealism.
Alongside the geographic identity, the international (functional) identity of the Baltic States is forming and constructed depending upon how they see their role in the new place of their ideological localization -in Europe or broader -in the West. The international identity constitutes a changing narrative on which a state's place and role in the international system is substantiated. The international identity is mostly related to the Baltic States' attitude and relations with Russia, a neighbor common to them and an important international policy actor. After declaration of independence, the Baltic States acted as a bridge between the East (Russia) and the West (Europe) as "a land of contacts". In foreign policy, such a conception of international identity corresponded to a widely discussed, yet never implemented neutrality policy. The metaphor of a state-bridge and the idea of neutrality related to it were discarded in 1994-1995 when the membership of NATO and the EU became the primary objective of foreign and security policy. It was replaced by the metaphor of a state-bridgehead of Western civilization 19 . The concept of Europe as a constituent part of Western community embodying Christian values corresponded best to the image of the Baltic States -the bridgehead of the West. In order to strengthen this conception, Samuel Huntington's idea of the conflict of civilizations was often resorted to, particularly in Estonia. The Baltic States considered themselves to be a wall separating Western civilization from non-Western Russia.
Beginning in 1997 when the prospect of the Baltic States to become EU members became more realistic 20 , motives of the Baltic States as the outpost of Europe surfaced in the construction of their identity 21 . It was emphasized that the Baltic States in relations with the post-soviet space disseminate the values and norms of Europe, becoming its representatives. In foreign policy, the identity of the outpost was institutionalized by participating in the activity of the EU Northern dimension as well as in the EU Eastern policy. It was anticipated that the Northern dimension "will help Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania adapt to their new role, which will make them a central actor in developing co-operation between the EU, Russia and nearby CIS countries"
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. The surveyed change in the international identity of the Baltic States does not lead to the juggling with metaphors; it indirectly indicates the degree of coming closer to Europe and is directly related to changes in relations with Russia. It is in the relations with Russia that the EU influence on the Baltic States' foreign policy manifests itself most. Russia is not only a neighbor of the Baltic States, but a strategic partner of the EU, an important EU supplier of energy resources. For example, such EU states as Germany and France have long-standing and deep traditions of cooperation with Russia. The Baltic States also have a long experience of relations with Russia which essentially differs from the European one. It is a long existence within the Russian empire 23 , a brief respite of independence in 1918-1940 later followed by nearly 50 years of Soviet Union occupation 23 Estonia and Latvia were a constituent part of the Russian empire in 1721 -1915 , Lithuania in 1795 -1915 national identity and mentality of the population. Because of the deportations of the Baltic States' inhabitants to Siberia and losses of the armed resistance in war and post-war years, the demographic composition of the population changed substantially, particularly in Latvia and Estonia. During the Soviet period Estonia and Latvia became multinational states 24 . After the restoration of independence in 1991, there were apprehensions not only of a direct Russian aggression, but also of its destructive economic and political influence by using Russian-speaking inhabitants. Estonian and Latvian politicians saw in them "the fifth column" capable of destroying the state from the inside 25 . Most probably this can explain why citizenship laws unfavorable for Russian-speaking people that had come during the years of Soviet occupation were adopted in Latvia in 1991 and in Estonia in 1992. These laws stipulated that only the inhabitants of Estonian and Latvian States between the wars and their descendants had the right to citizenship. Others having settled there during the occupation years had to undergo a complex naturalization procedure. In Lithuania, a zero option citizenship law was adopted according to which all people living in Lithuania at the time the law was passed enjoyed the right to citizenship.
It is not surprising that the political Copenhagen criteria became the essential problem in Estonia and Latvia when seeking EU membership: namely, the requirement to respect and protect the rights of minorities. At first glance, a problem of domestic policy turned into an international policy issue, the solution of which was sought by OSCE, the Commission of Europe, the European Council, the United Nations and, certainly, by Russia. Experiencing the "adaptation pressure of the EU" 26 , Estonia and Latvia changed their citizenship laws in the direction of compliance with European norms 27 . However, it should be pointed out that these changes even today do not meet Russia's expectations.
The aspiration to membership in the EU and NATO also had an impact on solving the issues of border agreements between the Baltic States and Russia. Estonia and Latvia strove that their territory be defined in compliance with the 24 During the soviet period, the number of Russian nationality inhabitants in Latvia increased from 8.8 per cent (1935) peace treaties of 1920 with Russia 28 pursuant to which part of present Russian territory belonged to them. With the EU and NATO summit meetings that had to evaluate whether the Baltic States meet the membership requirement close at hand, both Estonia (1996) and Latvia (1997) renounced their territorial requirements to Russia. In spite of this, the border treaty between Estonia and Russia was only signed in 2005, yet even today, it has not been ratified by Russia. Latvia and Russia signed the treaty even later -in 2007; in the same year it was ratified by both countries. Lithuania signed the land border treaty in 1997, but Russia ratified it only in 2003.The relations between Lithuania and Russia are dampened not by the issues of Russian minority rights, but by Lithuania's energy security problems connected with its dependence on Russian energy resources and issues of the military and civilian transit of Russia's Kaliningrad district through the territory of Lithuania. However, the issues of guaranteeing national minority rights periodically emerge in the relations between Lithuania and Poland.
A brief survey of the Baltic States' way to the EU makes it possible to point out that during that period both the self-awareness in the international space and the implementation of their foreign and security policy remained within the framework of nation state identity, characteristically premised on the idea of external threats. A positive identification with Europe was followed by the dissociation from non-Europe, thus emphasizing the threat of Russia. However, in public discourse, Europe is perceived not only as a part of the West, but also as a cultural threat to national identity. This tendency persisted even after the Baltic States started direct negotiations for membership. When harmonizing the legal system of Lithuania with the EU Acquis Communautaire without changing laws, bargaining was underway for exceptions which slowed down the establishment of European norms, restricting the state's sovereignty 29 . Advancing towards European norms has remained within the framework of the principle of conditionality.
In essence, Europeanization of the Baltic States' foreign and security policy took one direction -from top to bottom (from the center to national states), and it was an instrumental rather than a value-orientated rapprochement between the objectives of the Baltic States' foreign policy and the CFSP, complying with EU membership requirements. Aspiring to the membership, both domestic and foreign policy of the Baltic States was inevitably adaptive. Clearly defined membership requirements and a well thought-out control mechanism of their implementation left no particular space for the candidates' initiative. Being restricted by the commitment to comply with Acquis, to timely close negotiation departments or to seek compatibility of their defense struc-28 Estonia, comparing its territory with that that belonged to it according to the Treaty of Tartu of 1920, lost about 2,000 square kilometers. A part of the former Latvian territory, pursuant to the Treaty of Riga of 1920, at present belongs to Pskov district of Russia. To Lithuania, the treaty with Russia of 1920 was not so important. Comparing with the period between the wars, the territory of Lithuania has expanded: for the first time in the history of the country, both Vilnius and Klaipeda belong to it. 29 See: Maniokas, footnote 26.
tures with those of NATO, the Baltic States differed only in their place at the table of "advancement". Lithuania was among the most advanced on its way to NATO, while Estonia -to the EU. However, during this period the national projection of Europeanization surfaced. European Union requirements were used as a protective shield to justify unpopular internal and foreign policy decisions such as closing down the Ignalina nuclear plant and introducing visas for border residents.
The Baltic States in the European Union
At the end of 2002, following successful negotiations, alongside five other states of the post-soviet space, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Malta and Cyprus were invited to become EU members. The EU decision to accept as many as eight states of the post-soviet space was hardly to be explained by the arguments of instrumental rationality. It is not coincidental that in academic works analyzing EU enlargement, such notions as "normative order" 30 , "the community trap", "rhetoric action" 31 , "communicative rationality", "Europe as 'value-based community'" 32 , "EU collective guilt and responsibility" emerge 33 . Frank Shimmelfennig, who devoted a lot of attention to EU enlargement issues, claims that in the policy of the enlargement towards the East, Europe became hostage to its own normative identity under construction: "once caught in the community trap, states can be forced to honor identity-and value-based commitments" 34 and more established 36 . Ian Manners regards the European Union as a prime example of normative power. The concept of normative power embodies the ability of Europe to peacefully promote its core values beyond the boundaries of the EU. It is a power that, while realizing itself through ideas and opinions, is capable of changing the concept of "normality" in international relations 37 . Speaking with the world in normative terms, the EU constructs itself (through the dichotomy the Self/the Other) as a specific institution different from other existing political forms whose identity "pre-disposes it to act in a normative way"
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The narrative core of the normative power Europe is based on the principles of liberal democracy (democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms) 39 . This narrative creates international EU identity whose purpose is to substantiate the impact of the EU on world order to universalize the normative EU basis. It gives critical assessment of the European past, particularly the experience of World War II, whereas the European integration is conceptualized as the enlargement of security communities and new regionalization, creating common identity and promoting the spread of EU norms and values all over the world. This emerging identity is not the sum total of national identities, but is based on common principles and norms.
The New Neighborhood Policy (NNP), initiated in 2003 and approved in 2004, is related to the construction of the international identity of the EU as a normative power. Its strategy report reads: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to the Member States...
In its relations with the wider world, it aims at upholding and promoting these values"
40 (italicized by G. M.). The nature of cooperation with neighborhood states depends on the results achieved in the implementation of these values, i.e. the neighborhood policy is based on the already tested principle of conditionality, but is not related to an EU membership perspective.
Having become members of the European Union and NATO, the Baltic States were faced with a task of reformulating key foreign and security policy goals and finding their place within the CFSP of the EU 41 . The neighborhood policy provided an institutional framework for these objectives and new content for the construction of their international identity. The Baltic States are enthusiastically taking the role of the ambassadors of EU normative power in the post-soviet space. Cooperation with the former Soviet republics Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan is becoming a major direction of foreign policy of the Baltic States.
However, the Eastern direction of the EU NNP is also an important area of interest of Russia's foreign policy 42 ; the EU and Russia are competing for influence in the neighboring states. Having eagerly accepted the role of an instrument in this competition, the Baltic States activated the construction of the identity of Russia as the Other of Europe. The perception of Russia as a threat remains the key motive in political discourse of the Baltic States . The Baltic States suggest that the old European states should view Russia soberly, stop romanticizing its elemental power and unpredictability, and evaluate the potential threats lying in its restrictions on democracy as well as its imperial ambitions.
Treating Russia as a state that does not meet European standards, the Baltic States construct and stabilize their identity as nation states. However, while showing commitment to a European centre and demonstrating determination "to defend European values vis-à-vis the rest of the world" 47 , they construct the European identity, i.e. they Europeanize
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. This, at first glance, paradoxical Europeanization within the framework of the logic we/they is related to the specifics of the NNP. As Pertti Joenniemi points out, with the European Union turning into a traditional, whole entity resembling a nation state, the neighborhood policy performs a role of the transformation of the European space, promoting its differentiation. It is obvious that in recent years the neighborhood policy "worked as a form of indecision accompanied by both inclusion as well as exclusion" 49 . Criticizing the NNP for not giving the neighborhood countries an EU membership perspective, the Baltic States are striving to overcome this duality.
Although all Baltic States consider participation in the NNP an important instrument for joining the common foreign and security policy of the EU, the intensity of their participation is different. The Baltic States' joining the NNP coincided with the period of their economic growth. They willingly responded to being called the "Baltic Tigers" and were ready to share their recipes for success with other states. Lithuania was, for some time, the most active and ambitious in this role as a teacher, whereas Latvia was the most passive. Estonia regarded itself as a technologically advanced state, especially in communication technology and e-government development. Implementing the objectives of the policy of "the new possibility and pragmatism" 50 , Latvia focused its attention within the NNP on economic problems and intergovernmental issues of border crossing.
Lithuania's participation in the NNP was followed by the construction : in the 15-16th centuries, Belarus and a part of Ukraine were subject to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; a common Lithuanian-Polish state existed for several centuries (1569-1795). The identity of Lithuania as the leader of the region imposes on it the duty "to be a firm advocate of the development of Western democratic values and security, which supports countries seeking to take the European path" 53 . In the political discourse of Lithuania, the narrative of Europe as normative power is transformed into the construction of the identity of Lithuania as the center of the region 54 . While constructing the identity of the country-regional center, Lithuania relied on the normative model which, according to President Adamkus, imposes a duty to pursue a moral foreign policy based on principles rather than one-day interests. A gradual withdrawal from the identity of the regional center coincided with the reinforcement of pragmatic tendencies in the country's foreign policy.
Similar tendencies are also reflected in the construction of the national identity of other Baltic States. The narrative of the inter-war golden age is replaced by a new history of success where the key role falls to economic reforms and information society. Challenging the center of Europe, the Baltic States refuse the imposed role of pupils imposed on them; they are the carriers of progress to the East, proposing to the EU the ways leading further to the East
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. During the period of economic crisis, with the "Baltic Tigers" turning into "kittens", they were further pursuing the Eastern policy, getting actively involved in the implementation of new initiatives of the EU -the Eastern Partnership and the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.Their role as the teachers of the transition to democracy was supplemented by the experience of handling the crisis. It is not coincidence that at the beginning of 2011 an Eastern Partnership Training Center was established in Tallinn In their attempt to become full-fledged participants of the EU common foreign and security policy, the Baltic States soon noticed that the commonness in that policy within the field of their greatest interest, i.e. the relations with Russia, was merely good intention foiled by different interests of the states. It was evident that Russia was allowed to treat the new and the old states of the EU in its own way. Almost at the same time, it concluded an agreement with Germany on building the Nord Stream pipeline unfavorable to the Baltic States and closed the pipeline providing oil to the oil refinery plant of Lithuania.
It should be pointed out that the Baltic States are not unanimous in their relations with Russia. The closest in its position to the old European states is Latvia. It was the only Baltic State that positively evaluated the Nord Stream project and took a moderate position on the events regarding the "Bronze Soldier" in Tallinn in 2007. Lithuania is trying to shift the solution of problems with Russia to the European level. Despite its dependence on Russian gas and oil, it is trying to guarantee their supply not by strengthening bilateral relations with Russia, but by attempting to influence the relations between the EU and Russia. In 2008, Lithuania supported Poland's veto on the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia, demanding to supplement the agreement with guarantees for the Baltic States' energy security. After Poland had changed its position, Lithuania was the only EU state to assess the agreement critically. Lithuania's attempts to implement EU energy policy directives providing for liberalization of the energy market, separating gas supply from pipeline management, encountered fierce opposition from the main shareholders of the "Lithuanian Gas" "Gazprom" and the German E.ON -Lithuania pays more for natural gas than any other EU state. Latvia and Estonia that treated the EU directives in a more flexible way managed to negotiate a lower price for gas. In further perspective, the attempts of Lithuania in the de-monopolization of the energy market should prove economically justified, providing all EU states hold a unanimous position on this issue.
The sentiments of disappointment over the incapability (unwillingness?) of the EU to speak with one voice are increasingly evident in all Baltic States 57 . Vytautas Landsbergis expressed this disappointment in a radical form typical of him: "The EU is lost. In my opinion, it cannot find and it actually is not looking for a stronger foundation for its existence and its future" Striving for unanimity in the EU foreign and security policy, alongside the "de-masking " of Russia and curbing its ambitions, the Baltic States consider their task of the reinforcement of the Euro-Atlantic ties to be of no less importance. Having been attached by the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to the "new" Europe in 2003, they were and still are consistent supporters of USA foreign policy. The Baltic States, as members of the "Vilnius-10" who approved the anti-terrorist initiatives taken by the USA in the aftermath of September 11, support USA policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Stephan Mull, former USA Ambassador to Lithuania, defined the pro-American posture of the Baltic States and Poland as a voice of the new EU member states which is heard with satisfaction in Washington and which cannot be ignored by Brussels. In spite of changing circumstances, the Baltic States do not refuse the role of stabilizing Eastern Europe and strengthening transatlantic relationship 59 . Positively assessing the attempts of the EU to enhance the military dimension of security, they further associate their security with maintaining a strong transatlantic relationship. However, with the beginning of the Barack Obama era and with the lowering of the prestige of the USA as a guarantor of the Baltic States' security, they are attaching more and more significance to the cooperation between the Baltic and the Nordic States in the area of security 60 .
In Lieu of Conclusions
After a brief review of the tendencies of Europeanization of the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States, it is worthwhile to come back to the table presented in the first chapter, supplementing it with the characteristics of the Baltic States.
59 Urbelis V., 2003. "Changes in the US Global Security Strategy and its Implications for Lithuania", Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2002 , 2003 At the beginning of 2011, President Dalia Grybauskaitė emphasized that "close relations between the Nordic and Baltic countries were a priority of Lithuania's foreign policy". See: http://www.lrp.lt/ lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/glaudus_baltijos_ir_siaures_saliu_bendradarbiavimas_uz-tikrins_sekminga_regiono_ateiti.html , 2011 02 23 foreign and security policy of the Baltic States is more consistent than that of the European Union. Within the EU neighborhood policy, they emphasize the normative rather than the instrumental aspect, promoting a serious attitude to the European core values.
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